To what extent do parties in Africa behave in ways similar to parties in new democracies elsewhere in the world? Although a complete answer to this question is far beyond the intended scope of this piece, this article seeks to examine one important aspect of party behavior in one sub Saharan country -the candidate nomination behavior of the two major opposition party formations in Ethiopia. I examine the nomination behavior of the main opposition parties using a binary logistic regression technique. Th is paper finds that the primary Ethiopian opposition parties, the CUD (the Coalition for Unity and Democracy) and UEDF (the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces) were quite different in their nomination behavior, and that the CUD (more than the UEDF), exhibited nomination patterns similar to party nomination behavior in other new democracies.
Introduction: General issues and Objectives
To what extent do parties in Africa behave in ways similar to parties in new democracies elsewhere in the world? Although a complete answer to this question is far beyond the intended scope of this piece, this article seeks to examine one important aspect of party behavior in one sub Saharan country -the district candidate nomination behavior of the major opposition party formations in Ethiopia. More specifically I examine where (meaning in which electoral districts) the major opposition parties in Ethiopia nominated candidates for the parliamentary election of 2005. Examining the behavior of the opposition party organizations in Ethiopia as to where they nominate candidates may provide an indication as to whether these "parties" are evolving in ways suggested by existing theories of party development.
In this paper I examine only the behavior of the opposition parties and not the dominant governing party the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Th is is because with its massive resources, and dense network of allied "quisling" parties, the EPRDF is not faced with the same resource constraints facing the opposition parties. Th ey can afford to nominate candidates to every district, regardless of other factors. Further, a focus on legislative as opposed to executive elections is justified in that one of the most important factors affect ing party development historically has been the development of a party's legislative component, and the features of the party's legislative component acts as a key indicator as to the development of the party as a whole.
1 Also given that Ethiopia is one of Africa's only formally parliamentary systems (where the all powerful prime minister receives his mandate from the legislature), it is apropos to examine the legislative election (as opposed to executive election) given the relative centrality of the legislature in such a system.
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In this paper I employ a binary logistic regression technique to analyze a party's candidate nomination behavior. Th is technique is appropriate where the dependent variable is measured nominally (in this case whether or not the party nominated a candidate in a particular electoral district). By candidate nomi nation behavior I mean the candidates nominated by the major opposition parties in the publicly announced lists of candidates for the single member district elections that appeared in May 2005. In this paper I treat the two major opposition Ethiopian "electoral coalitions" (the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces or UEDF and the Coalition for Unity and Democracy or CUD) as "parties" in that they are consistent with the Downsian definition of parties as "teams. . . . seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election."
3 It is also consistent with other definitions of the political party offered by such scholars as Leon Epstein, Giovanni Sartori, and Kenneth Janda. 4 Although these parties may vary to the extent to
